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CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHT OF SOCIAL
CITIZENSHIP: A COMMENT ON FORBATH
Frank  L  Michehnan*
A constitutional right or guarantee  is "positive,"  let  us say, when it
imposes on  government  some obligation  to  bestir  itself, to  act, in  a
manner  conducive  to  the  fulfillment  of  certain  interests  of persons.
Contentious  as  it  is  to  suggest  that  American  constitutional  law
contains  any positive  guarantees,'  the  suggestion  appears  to  be  one
that does not die easily.  In the view  of Professor Forbath, it  is kept
alive  and  kicking  today  by  recollection  of  a  nineteenth  century
American democratic-republican  ideal of a society committed  to run
itself in  ways  designed  to  constitute  and  sustain  every  person  as  a
competent,  respected,  independent  contributor  to  political  and
economic life.2
No doubt, a line of argument proceeding from that recollected  ideal
points  toward  formulation  of  any  corresponding,  positive
constitutional right in terms of a social-citizenship conception  in which
work  occupies  a  central  place-that  is,  as  opposed  to  rights  of
guaranteed  access to provision of basic material  necessities  regardless
of work.  As Forbath further observes,  I have been  entirely receptive
to both the democratic-republican  ideal and its recollection.'  And yet
my  publications  of  the  1960s  and  '70s  spoke  always  in  terms  of
putative  constitutional  rights  to  guaranteed  provision  for  basic
material needs.'
Forbath offers explanation for this gap between argumentation  and
proposition.  He  suggests it may have stemmed from concerns  about
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.  189 (1989).
2.  See, e.g.,  William E. Forbath,  Constitutional  Welfare Rights: A  Brief History,
Critique and Reconstruction, 69  Fordham  L. Rev.  1821  (2001);  see also William  E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich.  L. Rev.  1 (1999)  [hereinafter
Forbath, Caste].
3.  See, eg., Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution  in the Constitutional
Idea of Property,  72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
4.  See, eg., Frank  I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional  Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman,
The  Supreme  Court 1968  Term-Forward: On  Protecting the  Poor Through  the
Fourteenth  Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
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legal  form,  reflecting  the  court-centeredness  of American  academic
constitutional  thought  over  the  period  during  which  my  pertinent
writings were produced.  If you think that constitutional  rights are for
courts and only courts to apply or put into action, then maybe you will
trim  your  ideas  about  how  to  formulate  any  putative,  positive
constitutional  right  to  your  ideas-or  what  you  see  as  prevailing
ideas-about  limits on the judiciary's  competence  and its proper role
in American government.  So if welfare rights seem less threatening to
prevailing ideas about judicial role and competence than would a right
of social citizenship-and  they do to me, in a way I'll soon specify-
that  could  help  explain  why  I  thought  and  wrote  of  positive
constitutional  rights  in  those  days  as  welfare  rights,  not  social-
citizenship rights.
But  of  course  that  explanation  fails,  or  falls  away,  as  applied  to
anyone whose thought has shucked court-fixation in favor of the views
that  the  constitution  enforced  by judges  is  not  all  the  constitution
there  is,  and  that  contention  outside  the  courts  over  constitutional
meanings  very  possibly  can  be  a  politically  cogent,  practically
worthwhile  activity.  And  am  I not  one  of the  shuckers,  one  of the
redeemed?5  And  is  it  not  time,  then,  for  me  to  embrace  a  social-
citizenship  conception of a positive constitutional guarantee,  in place
of a welfare-right conception?
I can't help reading Forbath as putting  to me that very question.  I
take  an intended lesson  to be something  like  this:  Any progressive-
minded person  who  (a)  takes  seriously  the  constitution  outside  the
courts,  and  (b)  takes  seriously,  as  a  true  or  a  persuasive  source  of
constitutional  meaning, the  actual  history  of expressly  constitutional
contention  among  the  citizenry  of  this country-anyone  who  thinks
that  Sager,6  Tushnet,7  and  Ackerman8  are  each  on  to  important
aspects  of  the  truth  about  American  constitutional  purposes  and
American constitutional  argument-ought  to feel  a strong  attraction
to  a  social-citizenship  conception,  as  opposed  to  a  welfare-rights
conception,  of positive  constitutional  rights in  the  economic  sphere.
At  least,  there  should  be  no  resistance  to  a  social-citizenship
conception stemming  from any  consideration  of legal  form.  To that
proposition,  I  feel  no  aversion  at  all.  What  I  want  to  do  here  is
explain  what  I  think  might  stand  in  the  way  of  easy,  widespread
acceptance of it.
5.  See, e.g.,  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional
Law,  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  John  Rawls  (Samuel  Freeman  ed.,
forthcoming 2001).
6.  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence  Sager,  The  Domain  of  Constitutional Justice,  in
Constitutionalism:  Philosophical  Foundations  235  (Larry  Alexander  ed.,  1998);
Lawrence Sager, Justice In Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. L. Rev. 410 (1993).
7.  See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
8.  See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations  (1998).
1894 [Vol. 69DEMOCRACY-BASED  RESISTANCE
Exactly  how  is  it  that  we  think  a  court-centered  view  of
constitutionalism  may  instigate  concerns  about  constitutional-legal
form?  Two answers come immediately to mind.  First is the sense we
may have that any alleged constitutional right should be cast  in terms
that  are justiciable, meaning  that  the  terms  leave  interpreters  with
little room for serious dispute about how to apply them, in most cases
to which the  terms will have  any conceivable  application.  Second is
the sense that any alleged constitutional  right should be cast in terms
that are narrow,  meaning they don't sweepingly  preempt major public
policy choices  from  the  ordinary  politics  of  democratic  debate  and
decision.  I insist that we  really do have  there  two answers,  not one.
As  possible  aims  for  the  formulation  of  a  constitutional  right,
justiciability and narrowness are quite distinct in both motivation and
application.
The  difference  in  application  is  easiest  to see.  Consider  Richard
Epstein's dream constitution:  no regulatory statute  is constitutional,
only  the  common  law  is.9  That constitution  is  both  unsurpassably
justiciable (is that a statute I see before me? then strike it down), and
maximally  non-narrow.  Consider,  on  the  other  hand,  the  South
African constitution's mandate to the government  to take reasonable
measures,  within  available  resources,  to  achieve  progressive
realization of a declared right of every South African to have access to
adequate housing."  That clause looks narrow enough-it is not on its
face  more  preemptive  of  democracy  than  the  modem  First
Amendment is" -but  it cannot be called justiciable in the sense I have
specified.
12
9.  See, e-g.,  Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of
PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21,  22-28 (1997).
10.  S. Afr. Const. (1996)  § 26:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate  housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
11.  For notable  cases applying  the  First  Amendment  to  block  lawmakers  from
regulating,  respectively,  the  expressive  burning  of American  flags,  the practice  of
turning over political  signature-gathering  to  paid firms,  commercial  advertising, the
amounts of money spent in political campaigns, and culpably negligent defamation  of
public officials (soon to become "public figures,") see, e.g., United States v.  Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990); Meyer v.  Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988);  Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens  Consumer Council,  Inc.,  425  U.S.  748 (1976);  Buckley  v.  Valco, 424  U.S.  1
(1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);  Gertz v.  Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
12.  Whether  that  makes  it  unfit  for  inclusion  in  a  constitutional  bill  of rights
expressly  committed  to judicial enforcement  is another  question,  answered  "no"  by
both the  drafters  of  South  Africa's  Constitution  and  that  country's  Constitutional
Court.  See  Government  of the Republic  of South  Africa  v.  Grootboom,  2001  (1)
SALR 46  (CC),  http://www.concourt.gov.zajudgments/2000/grootbooml.pdf  (finding
a failure  on the state's part to take "reasonable"  measures  to aid victims of housing
"crisis"  and  ordering  rectification);  In  re Certification  of  the  Constitution  of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996  (4) SALR 744 (CC)  76, http.//iwww.concourt.gov.za/
judgmentsl1996/const.pdf  (concluding  that  section  26 conforms  to  the constitutional
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Now let  us  have  a  look at  the  differing  motivations  for  the  pulls
toward  narrowness  and  toward  justiciability  in  the  formulation  of
constitutional  rights. The  pull toward  narrowness  reflects  a  concern
about  the constitution  preempting from  ordinary  democratic  politics
too large a share of the political choices a country may expect to face
from time to  time.  The  pull toward justiciability reflects  something
different,  a  theory  or  a  view  about  what  kinds  of  decisions  a
politicized legislature and an independent judiciary are comparatively
likely  to  make  well,  and  what  kinds  will  leave  them  respectively
subject  to  appropriate  forms  of  accountability  in  a  democracy' 3
(Roughly,  the  idea  is  that  an  independent  judiciary  is  better  at
decisions  calling  for  application  of  value-  and  policy-judgments
already recorded in what may be a very complex body of law, and can
effectively  be  held  accountable  for  such  decisions  by  professional
criticism;  whereas  decisions  calling  for fresh judgments  of policy  or
value, belong, in a democracy, to electorally  accountable lawmakers.)
If we  now compare  a social-citizenship  conception with  a welfare-
right conception of a positive constitutional guarantee in the economic
sphere, we can see that neither sort of conception trumps the other on
the scale of justiciability.  On the scale of narrowness, however, I must
say  I  think the  social-citizenship  conception  may  suffer  some in  the
comparison.  As  for  justiciability,  recall  the  South  African
constitutional  mandate  to  the  government  to  take  reasonable
measures,  within  available  resources,  to  achieve  progressive
realization  of  the  right  of  all  South  Africans  to  have  access  to
adequate  housing-a welfare right, not a social-citizenship  right.  On
the one hand, it would have been rash indeed-not to say foolish and
vain-for the drafters to have cast the housing right in terms any more
absolute  or  less  qualified  than  the  ones  they  chose.  On  the  other
hand,  the terms  they chose-the  state  has  a  duty  to make  the best
progress  it  reasonably  can  from  time  to  time-do  not  register
especially  high  on the  scale  of justiciability,  and  certainly  no  higher
than  would  a  declared  duty  of  the  state  to  do  the  best  it  can  to
maintain an economy and society in which everyone who wants it has
access  to respectable, fulfilling, adequately remunerated work.
On  the scale  of narrowness,  though,  there  does seem  to be  a  real
difference between the two formulations, with the advantage going to
the welfare right.  To see this, one need only heed Professor Forbath's
summary  of  what  a  constitutional  right  of  social-citizenship  was
thought to cover by its Populist sponsors in the Gilded Age:
freeing ...  labor ...  from  the  "iron  rule  of  the  Money  power"
through  public  credit  and  support  for  cooperative  enterprise;...
principle of separation of powers).
13.  See, e.g.,  Antonin  Scalia,  The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56  U.  Chi.  L.
Rev. 1175 (1989).
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nationalizing  the  railways;...  ensuring  for  industrial  workers  the
"right  to  a  remunerative  job"  through  public  works  and
countercyclical  spending  and,  through  an  end  to  the  repressive
common  law  restraints  on  workers'  collective  action  and  the
savagery of "government  by injunction,"  encouraging robust unions
and industrial cooperation;  and through  these agencies...  enabling
workers  to  exercise  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of control  over
productive property.14
To  which  we  in  our  own  times  may  add:  publicly  guaranteed
education  and training  for all, of adequate  quality; infant,  child,  and
elderly care; workplace health and safety, fair employment, wage and
hour  laws;  global  trade  issues  or  what  we  may  call  the  NAFTA
question;  macroeconomic  policy  and  controls;  public  oversight  of
industrial organization, including antitrust  and other legal counters to
restraints of trade;  anti-plutocratic  political institutions  and  practices
including campaign regulation; and I'm sure I've left a lot out.
In sum,  it  looks  as  though  a  constitutional  social-citizenship  right
has  tentacles  reaching  in  a  hundred  directions,  into  the  deepest
redoubts  of the common  law  and  the most basic choices  of political
economy a modem society can  make.  Abortion  aside-if it is aside,
which  it very  arguably  is  not  -what  leading  issues  on  the  current
American political calendar would be untouched?
So here is  the question:  Might this apparent,  formal characteristic
of a positive constitutional right of social citizenship-its  obvious and
decided lack of narrowness-call  forth resistance to such a conception
out of the pro-democratic  strain in American  constitutional  thought?
It seems to me it very likely would.  I don't say the idea should incite
pro-democratic  resistance,  I say it would.  (On normative  grounds, I
would argue that it should not, but I don't know how widely American
constitutional thought may share my understanding  of democracy as a
substantive, no less than a procedural, ideal. 5)
One might ask:  how could the idea of a positive constitutional right
of social citizenship stir democracy-based  resistance,  as long as we are
talking about the constitution outside the courts?  I have two answers
to  suggest.  The  first  is  that  we  here  today  are  not  at  liberty  to
fantasize about a constitution  completely outside the courts. However
receptive mainstream  American  constitutional  thought may be to the
idea  of  a  constitution  extending beyond the  courts,  it  is  not,  today,
about  to imagine  the  constitution  taken away from the courts.  The
point is  that mainstream  thought, therefore,  cannot  help but see,  in
every  proclamation  of  a  constitutional  right,  an  opening  and  a
14.  Forbath, Caste,  supra note 2, at 49.
15.  See, e.g.,  Frank I. Michelman,  Hunan Rights and the Limits of Constitutional
Theory, 13 Ratio Juris 63,  75 (2000); Frank I. Michelman,  "Protecting  tile People from
Themselves,"  or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45  U.C.L.A. L Rev. 1717,  1732-34
(1998).
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temptation to the judiciary to add some further sphere or spheres  of
public decision-making to the ones in which it already feels licensed to
take a sometimes heavy hand.
A second  answer  is more refined.  As we've  seen,  a  constitutional
duty  to  cater for  the  social  citizenship  of  every person  casts  a  very
wide-ranging  constraint  over public decision-making.  I  now want to
add that it does so, regardless of what degree of judicial  enforcement
may  be expected.  At least, that is  so  if we  take  the supposed  right
seriously  and  we  suppose  our legislators  conscientious.  (And  what
could  it  possibly  boot  our  cause  to  debase  the  constitutional
currency-and  I  mean  rhetorical currency-by  naming  something  a
constitutional  right  that  we  don't expect  to  be  seriously  taken,  by
public  officials  presumed  conscientious?)  Assuming  we  are  serious
about the extra-judicial, political  efficacy of the naming of something
as  a constitutional  right, then-many will think-we cannot  so name
social citizenship without intending a heavy drag on democracy,  even
if we mean also  (vainly) to be moving for the constitution to be taken
entirely away from the courts.
Speaking for myself, I think a critique along those lines of Forbath's
proposal  would  proceed  from  a  terribly  wrong  understanding  of
democracy.  On what I regard  as the better view of what democracy is,
the  blatant  "non-justiciability"  of a  social-citizenship  right-its utter
lack of mechanical  applicability to any hard or contested  question of
public policy-is exactly  what saves it from charges  of contrariety to
democracy.  (Remember, I am  assuming, now, that the courts are out
of the picture).  Recognition of a constitutional social-citizenship right
would  not  crisply  answer  any major question  of public policy.  The
most it could do (still assuming away the courts)-and what a gain for
democracy  if  it  really  could  do  this  much!-is  impose  a  certain
constraint  on  how  citizens  and  their  elected  representatives  would
frame  and approach  sundry  questions  of public  policy.  In  Rawlsian
language, the chief significance of recognition  of social citizenship  as a
constitutional right would be the special inflection, the special content,
it  would  give  to  American  public  reason.16  Across  a  very  broad
swathe of public  issues, such  a recognition would  demand that those
issues be approached as occasions for exercises of socially responsible
judgment-which choice will best conduce  to the social  citizenship  of
everyone? -rather  than  as invitations to press and to vote one's own
interests and preferences.
Of course, to call them matters of judgment is to see that these  are
matters  on which  opinions  can  and  will differ  markedly, reasonably,
and  sincerely.  But  surely  no  harm  to  democracy  lies  there.
Disagreements  over  constitutional-interpretive  judgment  make  as
16.  See John Rawls,  The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Collected Papers 573
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Michelman, supra  note 5.
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good a seedbed  for democracy, or better, than do conflicts of interest
or preference.  Democracy, then, will name  the practice  by which we
test, exchange,  revise, pool, and  count  the constitutional-interpretive
judgments  of  everyone  in  order  to  obtain,  from  time  to  time,  the
"institutional  settlements"  we  need.7  Now that  is  a pretty  idealistic
view.  Nor can I doubt it is  a minority  view, by  comparison  with the
view that democracy means, quite strictly, that the people are free  to
treat  their  political  agenda  as  a  series  of  contests  of  normatively
unregulated  preferences,  as  opposed  to  a  series  of  occasions  for
constitutional judgment  or constitutional  interpretation.  Given  that
cultural fact, we may expect a proposed constitutional positive right of
social  citizenship  to  provoke  a  democracy-based  objection  of  legal
form, namely, extreme non-narrowness.
In the wake of the naming of this right, it would seem, there would
loom three possible future courses of events:  Either (1) the judiciary
would  take up the constitutional  cause  of the positive  right of social
citizenship  and  dictate  in its  name  an insufferable  amount  of public
policy; or (2) the newly named right would be stillborn, a dead letter,
a joke,  honored  in  the  breach,  a  constant  reproach  and  threat  to
constitutional-democratic  legitimacy  in  this  country;  or  (3a)  the
natural, rightful energy of popular preference and self-serving partisan
struggle in public policymaking would be curbed and deadened  by an
almost unimaginable  pall of self-restraint;  or  (3b) the natural energy
of  popular,  judgment-bound,  publicly  reasonable,  deliberative
political contestation would at long last emerge into life and being.
Of course, 3a and 3b  are not alternative  possible courses of events.
They  are  alternative  descriptions  of  the  same  imagined  course  of
events from the standpoints of two contrasting views of the nature  of
constitutional-democratic  energy  at  its  possible  best.  I  wish  3b
expressed American political culture's prevailing view of that possible
best.  But I don't believe it does, and neither, Reader, do you.
17.  See  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Why  Voting?, 34  Loy.  LA.  L.  Rev.  (forthcoming
2001).  On "the principle of institutional settlement," see Henry  M. Hart, Jr. & Albert
M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the  Making and  Application of Law
1-10 (1994).
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